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MOTHERS, FATHERS AND THE LIFE
OF REASON:
THE CASE OF JOHN STUART MILL'S
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
M i c h a e l Palencia-Roth

I

The life of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was probably
viewed by his contemporaries as singularly full, successful and serene. He himself modestly called it "uneventful." They saw a man who had written the most
influential work on logic, the most influential one on
political economy, and important essays on liberty and
the subjection of women. They saw a man who, as a
Wunderkind under the systematic tutelage of his father,
had been an eloquent advocate of the Utilitarian philosophy and who, as a mature man, had become a responsible civil servant, not only in India House but also in
the British Parliament. Mill's life indeed seemed—as
did the life of Tolstoy's Ivan Ilyich for a while—to
' 'flow pleasantly and well'' and with far fewer problems
than are usual. But his life was not as "uneventful" as
he would have us believe; there was turmoil beneath the
placid surface. As a twenty-year-old, Mill suffered, as
he states in his Autobiography, a massive mental crisis
which paralyzed him intellectually for a time and from
which he emerged with somewhat different interests
and with a redirected sense of purpose. All became,
according to his telling of it, stable again. Yet if one
looks closely at the Autobiography and at the documents concerning other aspects of Mill's life, one sees
that this stability was, if not more apparent than real,
then at any rate certainly precarious. He reacted, for
example, to the deaths of his father, his mother, and his
wife in radically different ways, each of them extreme
and all of them as a whole indicative of deeply rooted
emotional problems and conflicts. This essay is an ex1
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ploration of the pattern of Mill's attitudes towards his
family and of the various changes in his life, with an eye
to discovering the connection these attitudes and
changes might have with his intellectual work and with
an eye as well to relating this kind of biographical study
to civilizational inquiry.
One may begin at the beginning. "I was born," writes
Mill in his Autobiography, "in London, on the twentieth of May 1806, and was the eldest son of James Mill,
the author of the History of British India." One remarks at once that Mill's mother has dropped from view
in his account of his birth. Why? It cannot be maintained that the omission is merely a slip of the pen, for,
reading on, one discovers that not once does Mill's
mother appear directly in the entire Autobiography.
There is the barest reference to her having existed, at
least, in Mill's acknowledgment that his father "married and had a large family" (p. 4).
The suppression of Mill's mother has not gone
completely unnoticed by critics. Victorian reviewers of
the Autobiography mentioned the mother's disappearance with disapproval. Bruce Mazlish, one of the few
critics to have singled out this sentence, even begins his
work on the two Mills by citing it, commenting that it is
"a new version of the immaculate conception, in which
the mother is entirely missing." Though Mazlish does
concern himself somewhat with Mill's relationship to
his mother, most of his book is devoted to the father-son
relationship, thus implicitly sanctioning Mill's account
of his birth. Mill's account, though not unnoticed, has
gone largely unexplained and has not really been related
to the rest of his life and work. Yet that simple and
deliberate omission acquires—when placed in
context—enormous importance for understanding
Mill's intellectual and personal development.
For the purposes of this presentation, Mill's omission
can be discussed in four overlapping contexts: "the
classical," "the pedagogical," "the autobiographical"
2
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and "the biographical." I shall discuss the classical and
the pedagogical only briefly, focusing most of my attention on the latter two terms. First, the classical (and
it is of some significance—though one should not claim
any direct influence—that Mill's education was based
on major classical texts): a scene from the end of Aeschylus' Oresteia trilogy vividly illustrates some of the
basic concerns behind my interpretation of Mill's life
and thought. At this point in the Oresteia a trial is being
conducted, the trial of a matricide. Orestes, accused of
the murder of his mother, is being defended by Apollo.
Because he knows that Orestes really did kill his
mother, Apollo shifts the grounds of Orestes' defense to
show that the killing of the mother cannot be considered
a serious offense. "The mother is no parent of that
which is called her child," Apollo tells the chorus, "but
only the nurse of the new-planted seed that grows. The
parent is he who mounts" (11. 658-60). Perhaps sensing
the chorus' disbelief, Apollo quickly comes to his point.
"I will show you proof," he says, pointing to Pallas
Athene. "There can be a father without any mother.
There she stands, the living witness, daughter of Olympian Zeus, she who was never fostered in the dark of
womb" (11.662-65). The power of this argument proves
decisive, for Athene, yielding to Apollo's words and
declaring that "there is no mother anywhere who gave
me birth'' (1.736), casts the deciding vote which acquits
Orestes.
And yet everyone in the play and in the audience
really "knew" that Apollo's account of Athene's parthenogenetic birth was a lie. Everyone knew the truth:
that Metis, pregnant with Athene, had been swallowed
by Zeus just before the birth was to take place. Zeus
kept Metis in his belly and gave birth to Athene out of
his own head. Here the ingested mother is conveniently
forgotten and Orestes acquitted. While sensing that
something is not quite right with Apollo's argument and
that he should not be allowed to get away with somePublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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thing so contrary to the known facts, his audience is
nevertheless persuaded by him. Hi power is not the
power of rhetoric alone but, strangely, the power of
logic as well. The steps in his thinking—the steps
which make his argument so difficult for the chorus and
Athene to refute—may best be illustrated by referring
to a version of the diagrammatic representations for the
distribution of terms by Euler, the 18th century Swiss
mathematician and logican.
Using Euler's circles, we may say that if we take class
A
A (or Zeus) [
) and class B (or Metis) with
B,
element C (or Athene) within it
c

4

©
then the most succinct way of describing the position of
C (Athene) if B (Metis) is made a class within A
A,
(Zeus) is to
say that C is in A; C is within class A:

A

/( C •

It is no longer necessary to cite B, the middle element, in order to describe the position of C; therefore,
the middle is dropped and B (or Metis, Athene's
mother) "vanishes." The relevance to Orestes' trial is
clear: if the mother (B) can be proven not to exist as a
parent then Orestes is not her son and cannot be convicted of matricide.
Perhaps another reason why Apollo's argument appears convincing is that, by analogy, it makes an
appeal—possibly to his listeners' unconscious—to
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol4/iss4/3
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syllogistic processes in which the middle also seems to
be dropped. Two forms of the syllogism will make this
clear. The first is that of the hypothetical syllogism: If
A, then B; and if B, then C; therefore, if A, then C. Or,
as the Barbara form of Aristotle's conditional syllogism
reads: if A is predicated of all B, and B is predicated of
all C, then it is necessary for A to be predicated of all C.
The middle term (B) is dropped in the concluding third
movement of this process.
One should note, however, that although the middle
is dropped, this does not mean that it actually ceases to
exist, and logicians would argue for the importance of
its continuing existence. B may even be said to be the
carrier of the meaning since without it there would be no
meaningful connection between A and C. However,
Athene's conclusion stems from the belief, planted in
her by Apollo, that the middle has vanished in fact. In
acquitting Orestes she acts for a moment as though the
metaphor were—or had become—real. In describing
his birth Mill also acted as though the metaphor of the
disappearing mother were real. Paradoxically and
ironically—though maybe appropriately—Mill was
himself a logician whose greatest contribution to the
history of logic was, he thought, to have criticized
Aristotelian syllogistic processes in the formulation of
his own.
In so describing his birth Mill has in effect demonstrated—and this is part of the "pedagogical"
context—the success and thoroughness of his father's
educational experiment. Early in Mill's life, his father
seems to have taken him away from his mother and to
have tried to educate and raise him virtually alone,
"parthenogenetically," in order to demonstrate certain
pedagogical principles. James Mill and his circle (e.g.,
Jeremy Bentham) were stoics in their pedagogical
views, believing not only in the separation of emotion
and reason but also in the inherent superiority of the
latter and consequently in the need for it to be domi5
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nant. This belief resulted in a pedagogical discipline
which separated the mind from the heart and kept the
pupil away from emotional disturbances. The mother
and the inherently emotional forms of her influence
were kept at a distance as much as possible; conversely,
the father and the "rational'' forms of his influence
were emphasized.
II
What are motherly and fatherly values and what is
their relationship to individuation, to the processes of
maturation? Motherly values—which are in a civilizational context the values of primitive peoples (early
religions exalted Mother-Goddesses and feminine
votaries)—emphasize, in the words of Erich Fromm in
The Art of Loving, warmth, food, satisfaction, security;
in metaphorical terms she is home, nature, soil and
ocean. Her love is unconditional, given freely and
without restriction. Opposed to motherly values are
fatherly values. These values—which are the values
considered most important in more civilized societies
(later religions such as Judaism or Christianity are patriarchal, exalting God the Father; even the Virgin
Mary, in Catholicism, occupies a secondary position)—emphasize, again in the words of Erich
Fromm, "the world of thought, of man-made things, of
law and order, of discipline, of travel and adventure."
Fatherly love is conditional; it can be withdrawn, for its
main requirement is obedience. Fatherly values appeal
also to hierarchizing, to a notion of order which has its
societal analogue in laws of inheritance and primogeniture, and its grammatical analogue in the syntax of
ordination and subordination. Fatherly values thus
stand behind much we consider necessary for an ordered society and for good, logical argumentation. On
examining Apollo's defense of Orestes we see that,
metaphorically, the argument depends—as all argu7

8

9

10

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol4/iss4/3

6

35 Stuart
Palencia-Roth: Mothers, Fathers and the Life of Reason: The Case of John

ments ultimately do—on dropping middles or subsuming or "ingesting" them (as Zeus ingested Metis), for
that is how conclusions are attained. The dropped middle, in this metaphor, is the mother, and as the mother
disappears so also tend to disappear those motherly
values cited above.
In the psychology of individuation, the human being
must—if he is to attain true maturity—eventually harmonize within himself motherly and fatherly values,
internalizing and developing both a motherly and fatherly consciousness. If he succeeds, he becomes a
fully individuated and loving human being, compassionate and kind both in principle and in action. If he
fails, he may become neurotic in some way, and his
neurosis is likely to manifest itself most clearly in his
actions and attitudes toward those people closest to
him.
Ill

With these values in mind, I should like to turn now to
the "autobiographical" context. As I have indicated
earlier, Mill's mother is conspicuous by her absence in
the Autobiography. This does not mean that Mill simply
did not think of her. Perhaps paradoxically, the disappearance of Mill's mother from the final text might be
considered an act of editorial mercy on the part of John
Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor and any others involved in
editorial decisions. With one unimportant exception,
every single deleted description of the mother is negative. The father's "ill assorted marriage" (Stillinger, p.
66) is due to the mother not having "kindred intellect,
tastes or pursuits" (p. 4, note; Stillinger, p. 36). At
another point Mill states that he did not have "the
slightest regard" for his mother's "remonstrances" on
his "ill breeding and impertinence" (p. 21, note; Stillinger, p. 56, note).
Perhaps the most negative of the deleted passages
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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reads as follows:

That rarity in England, a really warm hearted mother, would in
the first place have made my father a totally different being, and in
the second would have made the children grow up loving and
being loved. But my mother with the very best intentions, only
knew how to pass her life in drudging for them. Whatever she
could do for them she did, and they liked her, because she was
kind to them, but to make herself loved, looked up to, or even
obeyed, required qualities which she unfortunately did not pos(p. 33, note; Stillinger, p. 184
s e s s

The deletions of his mother from the final text show not
only that Mill tried to give a parthenogenetic account of
his own birth but also that he tried to give a similar
account of his own growth. Immediately after the preceding passage, Mill concludes that "I thus grew up in
the absence of love and in the presence of fear." The
context of this sentence allows us to restate it this way:
"I thus grew up in the absence of my mother and in the
presence of my father." This negative passage is interesting also for two other reasons. First, Mill indicates
that a warm hearted mother was a rarity in England,
insinuating that his mother was typical and that
nineteenth-century family patterns were therefore
somewhat like his. Second, though this passage is so
negative, or possibly because of its negativity, it may
explain some of Mill's general attitudes towards life, his
interests and behavior as an adult and mature man.
Erich Fromm maintains that if the mother is cold and
unresponsive (and in Mill's eyes his own certainly was),
the child will transfer the need for protection to the
father and may develop into a "one-sidedly fatheroriented person, completely given to the principles of
law, order and authority, and lacking in the ability to
expect or receive unconditional love. This development
is further intensified if the father is authoritarian and at
the same time strongly attached to the son."
Mill's father was—to all appearances—strongly attached to his son. If nothing else, the extraordinary
amount of time they spent together demonstrates that.
And, as all the major biographical accounts of John
11
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Stuart Mill's life stress, Mill apparently repaid his father
in kind: he was a father's son. The father was certainly
a formidable model: described by his contemporaries as
a brilliant conversationalist, breathtakingly lucid and
forceful, described by modern critics as a man of
abstractions and principles, a man of vast theoretical
knowledge.
Many of the early pages of the Autobiography read
like a rationalist's hagiography of the father. Of all his
father's strengths, the one most often singled out for
praise by Mill was his analytic habit of mind. His father
owned an extensive library of books on logic (p. 74) and
was expert in syllogistic logic (p. 13), in which the son
was repeatedly drilled. It is to this kind of education that
Mill feels "most indebted" for his capacity as a thinker
(p. 13). The elder Mill inculcated in his son his own way
of thinking, his own opinions and values. At one point
Mill states that his father's word on a subject had ' 'fixed
[his own] opinion and feeling from that time forward"
(P- 22).
Such a formidable mind and personality should
arouse strong feelings in a son, and since the elder Mill
was probably more domineering towards his son than
he was towards his friends, it is not surprising that
Mill's admiration for his father is tinged with ambivalence . This ambivalence is both explicit and implicit in
the published text and in its deleted passages, and in
contemporary accounts of Mill. For instance, the tentative criticism implied in the statement that the father's
"teachings tended to the undervaluing of feeling" (p.
67) points towards more negative feelings evident in
both the final text and the early draft. Mill's father was
"chiefly deficient" in "tenderness," had a constitutional irritability (p. 32), a critical eye (p. 10), "asperities of temper" and no spontaneity. At the same
time, however, Mill feels compelled to come to his
father's defense. His father was not, Mill says, "himself
cold hearted or insensible" (and notice that, as I have
mentioned earlier, Mill's mother is accused of being
12
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cold hearted); rather, his father merely "thought that
feeling could take care of itself' (p. 67). And Mill professes himself grateful for the "amount of labour, care,
and perseverance" (p. 5) which his father exerted in
educating him.
As far as the pattern of his life as a whole is concerned, Mill divides it into three general stages: precrisis, crisis, and post-crisis. Until 1826, the year of his
crisis, Mill was clearly dominated by his father. As a
child, Mill was "extremely subdued and quiet" in his
father's presence (p. 21), questioning neither his father's authority nor the authority of adults in general.
Lady Bentham, with whose family Mill spent over a
year in France in 1820 and 1821, wrote James Mill that
the boy was thankful for criticism and anxious to please
his elders. Such thankfulness may have been simply
the instinct for survival in a child whose domineering
father had decreed that he learn Greek at three years of
age, Latin at eight, logic and political economy at
twelve. And, even later, the domination was at times
more thorough than one might expect. For instance, in
the second number of The Westminster Review, Mill
himself continued an article written by his father in the
first number. A deleted passage in the Autobiography
remarks that "many if not most of the readers did not
suspect that the continuation was by a different hand
from the first article" (Stillinger, p. 93), so closely were
they allied in substance, tone and style.
"One of the turning points in [Mill's] mental history"
occurred after his return from France in 1821 and upon
his reading of Dumont's accounts of Bentham's speculations in the Traite de legislation', from that moment to
his mental crisis in 1826 he was an apostle of Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism was of course his father's
creed, and Mill even called it a "religion" (p. 42).
Utilitarianism is, to give one definition of it, a philosophy of ends, a philosophy of the greatest good or happiness for the greatest number. A philosophy of ends
16
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must de-emphasize means, must subordinate means to
those ends, must, in other words, de-emphasize or subordinate middles. Significantly, Mill was during this
time, according to his own description, "a mere reasoning machine" (p. 66).
"The time came," Mill writes, "when I awakened
from this [phase] as from a dream": autumn 1826, the
time of his mental crisis. In fact, Mill had several crises,
but, for the purposes of the Autobiography, he seems to
have compressed them into one. Its central formulation
is extremely interesting in light of my focus and should
be quoted in full:
In this frame of mind [of "dull. . . nerves" and "indifference"] it
occurred to me to put the question directly to myself, "Suppose
that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in
institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could
be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great
joy and happiness to you?" And an irrepressible selfconsciousness distinctly answered, "No!" At this my heart sank
within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been found in
the continual pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm,
and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I
seemed to have nothing left to live for. (p. 81)

Not only has Mill chosen understated, unemotional
language to describe an intensely emotional state, but
he also speaks of that state as though it were part of a
scientific experiment. The crisis is even put into the
form of an hypothesis. That is, if the objects of change
are realized, then there should be joy. The pursuit of the
objects of change should make Mill happy. However,
since Mill would actually not be happy upon the realization of his goals, since there no longer seems to be any
necessary and logical relationship between purpose,
realization of purpose, and happiness, "the whole
foundation" of his life collapses. It is only after the
negative conclusion to Mill's hypothesis has been attained, not before, that his heart sinks within him and he
enters the slough of despond; such an orderly nervous
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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breakdown could only happen to a logician. In addition,
Mill has explained his collapse in terms of ends and
means: the "ends" (that is, the conclusions, the results)
have "ceased to charm" and Mill therefore has lost
"interest in the means" (that is, the middles). This is
certainly a Utilitarian intepretation of the means, seen
not as intrinsically important but as important only with
reference to the ends. Neither in the depths of his despair nor in his analysis of it has Mill broken away from
his past.
In order to break way from his past, to free himself
from his upbringing, Mill would have to assert the importance of the means independently of—or at least not
subordinate to—the ends. This was eventually what he
came to assert. First, however, he set out to reread his
favorite books, trying to draw from them some
"strength and animation" (p. 81). But this was a mistake; this was clinging to the past. He felt distress also
because there was no one in whom he could confide, no
one he loved sufficiently, no one to whom he could turn
for assistance. And the person who could help least
was, Mill says, his father (p. 82), for he had "no knowledge of any such mental state" (p. 82) as Mill's. On then
analyzing his education, which had been "wholly" the
work of his father, Mill concluded that his acquired
analytical power had worn away "the feelings," that
analytic habits strengthened cause-and-effect relationships, the connections between means and ends, and
weakened those relationships based on feeling, desire
and pleasure (p. 83). Mill felt—he said—like a wellequipped ship, with a rudder but with no sail (p. 84).
And yet through all of his description of his dejection
and its causes Mill never explicitly and unequivocally
placed the blame directly on his father. Perhaps that
would have been too much for a son who up to that point
had worshipped his father unquestioningly.
The first major step towards a solution of his crisis
came, Mill says, "accidentally"; it certainly came unhttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol4/iss4/3
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consciously. That step depended, appropriately
enough, on finding some sort of relief from his father's
oppression. If the cathartic incident had not occurred,
Mill would surely have had to invent it:

I was reading Marmontel's Memoirs, and came to the passage
which relates his father's death, the distressed position of the
family, and the sudden inspiration by which he, then a mere boy,
felt and made them feel that he would be everything to them—
would supply the place of all that they had lost. (p. 85)

The vivid scene moved Mill "to tears" and the "burthen grew lighter" from then on. A psychoanalytically
sensitive Mill would have recognized his catharsis as
the abreaction of his repressed hostility towards his
father. One must "kill," overcome, or deny the parent
in order to assert one's ego. That Mill conforms to this
pattern may be seen from the following sentences:
"The oppression of the thought that all feeling was dead
within me [another way of describing the fear that his
father's education had been completely successful],
was gone. I was no longer hopeless: I was not a stock or
astone" (p. 85). Mill was not, in other words, his father,
for he did not possess that patriarchal, lapidary rigidity,
and this discovery gave him the courage to develop
independently, to find his own means of maturation.
Mill now wished to enjoy "the ordinary incidents of
life": sunshine and sky, books, conversation, public
affairs (p. 85). And though he had several relapses, he
was never again as unhappy as he had been, for he
learned to find enjoyment in things in themselves and
not as means to something else (pp. 85-6). He learned to
enjoy life "without dwelling on it or thinking about it,
without. . . putting it to flight by fatal questioning" (p.
86), and this became his theory and philosophy of life
(p. 86).
"For the first time," Mill writes, he began to give "its
proper place, among the prime necessities of human
well-being, to the internal culture of the individual,"
ceasing to attach so much importance "to the ordering
of outward circumstances, and the training of the
17
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human being for speculation and action" (p. 86). In
other words, he now considered motherly values to be
more important than fatherly values, or at least equal to
them. Mill's own phrases or words which come to be
associated with motherly values are: "the passive susceptibilities," "the cultivation of the feelings," "poetry and art," "the imagination," "Wordsworth,"
"Harriet Taylor," and "love."
It should not be assumed that upon the discovery of
motherly values Mill neglected all that he had learned or
that he committed himself mind and heart to the opposite of what his father had taught him. Some dismayed
contemporaries indeed saw it that way. Mill, however,
never allowed his ordered life completely "to fall to
pieces, but was incessantly occupied in weaving it
anew" (p. 94). And though he sought the "cultivation of
the feelings," and though this cultivation "became one
of the cardinal points" in his "ethical and philosophical
creed" (p. 86), he tried always to maintain "a due
balance among the faculties," a balance, in my terminology, between motherly and fatherly values.
The first major step in the "internal culture" of his
life was the reading of poetry. Of particular help here
was Wordsworth's poetry. But Mill not only read poetry; he argued about it in public debates and wrote
about it. The early 1830s saw the appearance of such
essays as "Two Kinds of Poetry," and "What is Poetry?", and a series of articles headed "The Spirit of the
Age" which Carlyle thought—mistakenly, according to
Mill—signalled the arrival of "a new mystic" (p. 104).
In 1830 Mill met Harriet Taylor; soon they were
exchanging passionate letters. This affair became a
scandal in London, at first because Harriet Taylor was a
married woman with children, and subsequently because the affair remained platonic. (Carlyle referred to
her sarcastically as Mill's "Platonica.") From the
scanty evidence we have it seems that their marriage,
which took place in 1851, two years after the death of
18
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the husband, was equally platonic. Harriet Taylor, "the
chief blessing" of Mill's existence, in a sense "completed" him as a thinker though, personally, his passion
for her developed into an extraordinary dependence.
Whatever else may be said of Harriet Taylor, it cannot be denied that she made Mill more alive emotionally. Mill the reasoning machine threatened, as Marshall Cohen has commented, to become a sensitive
plant. And perhaps it was more the emotional influence of Harriet Taylor than, say, the intellectual influence of Coleridge or Carlyle, that moved Mill to write
sentences like the following typical one in On Liberty :
"Human nature is not a machine to be built after a
model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it,
but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on
all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces
which make it a living being." Harriet Taylor embodied
warmth, emotion, feeling, tenderness, poetry, imagination, the force of concreteness over abstraction, the
liveliness of intuition over reason. She even embodied
the mother, for Mill clung to her, as Ruth Borchard
writes, the way a small child would cling to a mother.
Perhaps she gave him that warmth and affection which
his mother supposedly denied him. And perhaps there
was something in a name, for Mill's real mother was
also named Harriet. The recovery of meaning for Mill
necessitated the creation—or recreation—of the
mother. So helpless did Mill apparently feel that he gave
himself over to Harriet Taylor's guidance. At first she
instructed Mill in matters of feeling, just as his father
had instructed him in matters of intellect. Later she
seemed to have come close to instructing him in everything: from such profound and timeless matters as the
question of liberty to more mundane ones, as the handling of his neighbors.
Mill's intellectual development seems to have been
based on his changing emotional states. As Mazlish
suggests, the work arises directly out of the character.
19
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Not only did Mill become a literary critic at a time when
literature was desperately important to him emotionally, but his political and philosophical writings may be
said to have emotional roots as well. In retrospect,
according to Mill, one of the greatest obstacles to his
happiness was the analytical habit of mind which his
father had taught him. That analytic habit was both
deductive and syllogistic (James Mill's ovmElements of
Political Economy was written and argued on deductive
principles). Mill's first and extended important work,
one of the works on which he thought his reputation
would rest, was A System of Logic, begun while his
father was still alive and published seven years after his
death. Mill's Logic was conceived as an attack on the
Aristotelian categorical syllogism as an instrument for
obtaining truth. Mill's criticism would, without distortion, be called a criticism of the deductive syllogism, of
reasoning which operates by dropping middles in attaining conclusions. Mill maintained that the conclusion of a categorical syllogism contained no information
which was not already implicit in the major premise.
Since, in Mill's view, the conclusion added no new
information, the categorical, deductive syllogism could
not be used as an instrument to discover "truth." At
most, it could be used to test the validity of existing
arguments. In the place of deduction, that is, argument
from major premises, argument which Mill maintained
involves a petitio principii, Mill would put induction,
that is, argument from particulars. In other words, Mill
wanted to argue from concrete experience first; his
logic was therefore "empirical." Induction which led to
inference was the main instrument for evaluating "evidence" and for discovering "truth." Putting concreteness, particularity, and experience back into logic is
perhaps analogous—on a personal level for Mill—to
putting emotion, feeling and poetry back into life.
The movement away from mechanical, deductive
processes to more organic, inductive ones occasioned
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol4/iss4/3

16

Palencia-Roth: Mothers, Fathers and the Life of Reason: The Case of John Stuart
45

Mill's criticisms of his father and actually signified
Mill's intention, perhaps subliminal, to supplant him.
Mill had become convinced by 1830 that "there was
really something more fundamentally erroneous in my
father's conception of philosophical method, as applicable to politics, than I had hitherto supposed there was''
(p. 95). Mill's own Principles of Political Economy was
therefore argued inductively, a necessary correction,
Mill thought, of his father's deductive work. Correction
was, in effect, supersession, the idea of which existed at
least in Mill's unconscious mind immediately after his
father's death. A sentence deleted from the final draft,
describing Mill's reaction at the time, makes this clear:
"I now had to try how far I might be capable of supplying his place" (Stillinger, p. 161). This is exactly like
Marmontel's reaction to his own father's death.
The place of honor in the Autobiography is given, of
course, to Harriet Taylor, who nourished Mill's feelings
and thoughts and who eventually came to signify everything to him. It is therefore entirely appropriate that
her death should evoke the most moving writing in the
whole work. Her death made him re-experience, in a
different way, the loss of meaning. For the remaining
fifteen years of his life Mill felt orphaned intellectually,
spiritually and emotionally. Perhaps that was why her
memory became for him—as Utilitarianism had been
years earlier—a kind of religion. Perhaps that was also
why Mill in time became so dependent upon his stepdaughter. In effect, he tried to make her take the place
of Harriet Taylor, who had in turn taken the place of the
mother he thought he never had.
Mill dedicated the remainder of his work and life to
the memory of Harriet Taylor; and he seemed also by
the time of her death to have fused—or "woven" (p.
94)—an emotional content with a rational style. The
content: subjects like liberty, nature, religion and, most
importantly, the subjection of women. The style:
clear, precise, logical, heavily dependent upon the
23
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syntax of ordination and subordination. One example,
taken from the essay On Liberty, will illustrate this
fusion:

But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is,
that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose,
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.
It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each
of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to
it.
24

To his contemporaries, in the last years of his life Mill
had become, in a way, a sage. He seemed to have
succeeded in balancing—philosophically at least—the
eighteeneth century and the nineteenth, Neoclassicism
and Romanticism, reason and emotion. In one view, he
even did more than merely balance apparent opposites.
What Mill achieved, according to John Durham, was a
"synthetic view," a view which allowed him, in two
essays, to describe Bentham, the great Utilitarian, and
Coleridge, the great Romantic, as allies. Whoever could
master the premises and methods of these two utterly
different seminal minds would, Mill wrote, "possess
the entire philosophy of his age." Mr. Durham thinks
that Mill himself "came very near to achieving that
mystery." "Verbindet die Extreme," as Friedrich
Schlegel writes, "so habt ihr die wahre Mitte."
25

26

IV
Mill was a man whose individuation seemed—against
heavy odds—to be successful. He was a man who overcame his "parthenogenetic" upbringing, who worked
his way through various crises and losses of meaning to
emerge a better and stronger human being. Speaking in
terms of the psychology of individuation and of the
illustration from the Oresteia, one may say that until his
crisis Mill had (in our interpretation of his retrospective
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analysis) "killed" his mother, or that she had been
"killed" for him, and that his interest in logical argumentation and Utilitarian philosophy was the equivalent of Apollo's position. His crisis occurred because
he discovered that he was living a lie—the lie that
Apollo and Athene gave credence to. And Mill could
not acquit himself as easily as Athene had acquitted
Orestes. Therefore, in order to establish the balance
necessary for psychological well-being, he "killed" his
father, or "killed" his domination, and resurrected his
mother both in his new-found philosophy of life and in
the person of Harriet Taylor. Subsequently he took the
place of his father and he made Harriet Taylor take the
place, with differences of course, of his mother. From
that time forward his work demonstrated the kind of
balance between motherly and fatherly values which he
had achieved in his personal life.
This interpretation remains, however, unsatisfactory
and too incomplete, even though it is more or less
consistent with the evidence presented in the text of the
Autobiography itself. Yet even some of that evidence
is, by implication, contradictory. For example, Mill
wrote the Autobiography as a mature man, supposedly
as a fully—or nearly so—individuated human being and
nonetheless he suppressed his mother completely and
was bitterly antagonistic towards her in the deleted
passages. That action, inconsistent as it is with those of
a fully individuated human being, points to problems so
deep as never to have been resolved. In order to explore
those problems more fully we cannot rely on the Autobiography alone but must consider its' 'biographical"
context. That context points in turn to the tragic dimensions of Mill's far from "uneventful" life.
From the Autobiography the reader draws a picture
of a child who revered, respected, feared and obeyed
his father. This picture, in comparison with other accounts of Mill's relationship with his father, seems to be
largely accurate. The Autobiography gives absolutely
no impression of Mill's mother, for she has vanished
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from the surface of the text. Earlier drafts reveal Mill's
deep antagonism towards her. If one had only the drafts
to go on, one might conclude either that the mother was
totally unimportant in his life as a boy or that he really
had disliked her and that, by not mentioning her in the
final draft, he had chosen the kinder solution.
Biographers, however, keep us from reaching this
kind of superficial conclusion, for they reveal a different Mill as a boy. The young Mill seems to have been
devoted to his mother. One contemporary notes that
' 'John Mill always seemed to be a great favorite with the
family. He was evidently very fond of his mother and
sisters, and they of him . . ." Another states that "John
was devotedly attached to his mother and exuberant in
his playful tokens of affection." Letters to his mother
written during his youth, though not many in number,
show a genuine affection.
What happened to change the loving young man into
an indifferent and occasionally bitter middle-aged one?
No single satisfactory answer has really been given, for
there is no single cause. The core of an answer might
emerge, however, when one looks at Mill's reactions to
the deaths of his father and mother, at Mill's estrangement from his family and more closely at his relationship with Harriet Taylor.
The death of a father, maintains Freud in what is
certainly a patriarchal assertion, is perhaps the most
moving experience in a man's life. And yet it seemed for
Mill not to have been so. The language describing his
father's death (p. 122) is austere and formal; it might
have concerned the death of a distant colleague. Carlyle's account of a visit to Mill just after his father's
death would seem to substantiate this impression.
"There was," writes Carlyle, "little sorrow visible in
their house, or rather none, nor any human feeling at all;
but the strangest unheimlich kind of composure and
acquiescence, as if all human spontaneity had taken
refuge in invisible corners. Mill himself talked much,
27
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and not stupidly—far from that—but without any emotion of any discernible kind. He seemed to me withered
into the miserablest metaphysical scrae [old shoe],
body and mind, that I had almost ever met with in the
world."
But it cannot be maintained that Mill was totally
unaffected, for he suffered his first major illness in ten
years during and after his father's death: a painful
affliction of the head which required a three month's
leave of absence from India House and a tour in Switzerland and Italy. Alexander Bain writes that the illness
was an "obstinate derangement of the brain." While
any single diagnosis must remain suspect, it is possible
to consider Mill's illness to be in part psychosomatic.
The outer man showed no visible emotion; the inner
man became ill. Mill was ill quite often after 1836 and
took several extended leaves of absence from India
House. One severe illness came in 1848, after the completion of Principles of Political Economy, the work
that was Mill's final gesture toward supplanting his
father. He was also ill in 1854, before, during and after
his mother's death.
The death of Mill's mother was, as I have mentioned,
passed over in silence in the Autobiography. For the
last three years of her life, Mill's mother seems to have
been mostly ignored by her son. Though he lived in
London, he seldom visited the family. If the mother
wished to see her son she could make a fifteen minute
appointment with him at India House. During her final
illness, Mill visited her bedside but once, and, knowing
she was dying, took off yet again on a tour of the
continent in pursuit of his own health. His last letter to
her, written six days before her death, betrays a chilling
formality:
28

29

30

31

June 9, 1854
My dear mother,
I hope that you are feeling better than when I saw you last week
& that you continue free from pain. I write to say that I am going
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immediately to the Continent by the urgent recommendation of
Clark who has been pressing me to do so for some time past &
though I expect to return in a few weeks it will probably be to
leave again soon after. I wish again to remind you in case it has
not already been done how desirable it is that some one who is
fixed in England should be named executor to your will, either
instead of me, which I sh prefer, or as well as myself.
My wife sends her kindest wishes & regrets that her weak
health makes it difficult for her to come to see you as she would
otherwise have done. Ever my dear mother affectionately yours
J.S.M.
d

32

When news of her death reached Mill on the 26th of
June, it was received, according to Borchard, without
emotion. In a letter to Harriet Taylor Mill on the same
day, Mill professed relief at having been away at the
time: "It is a comfort that my poor mother suffered no
pain—& since it was to be, I am glad that I was not in
England when it happened, since what I must have done
& gone through would have been very painful & wearing & would have done no good to anyone.'' It was,
one might say, a utilitarian response. No one knows
exactly why Mill cut his mother off the way he did.
Perhaps he feared the depth of his response and the
possibility of losing control of the tenuous "balance"
he had achieved. In any case, even Mill's family did not
know, though extracts from a letter Mill's sister wrote
to him are extremely suggestive. The indirect cause was
Mill's relationship and marriage with Harriet Taylor;
the direct cause, if any, might be said to be a matter of
principle. "My dear John," writes Mary Colman on
the 18th of July 1851,
33

34

In thinking over the strange change which appears to have taken
place in your character, which has taken place in your conduct
towards your family, during the last six months . . . . I determined honestly to write and remonstrate with you on your
present conduct. Under these circumstances I could not help
recalling the letters which you sent me immediately before my
marriage, letters which first made me aware that individually I
was an object of no interest to you, that you had no affection for
me . . .
I thought that I had perhaps been presumptuous that the expressions of kindness which you had been in the habit of using
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol4/iss4/3
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towards me, the uniform kindness you had shown me, I had no
right to suppose proceeded from love to myself, but from a
principle of not giving others needless pain . . .
[Mary continues, mentions the break with a sister and the
family and asks]: What has she done, what has anyone done,
what do you alledge? I can find nothing except that my mother did
not call on your wife the day after you had announced your
engagement, the propriety of which step as a matter of Etiquette
remains to be settled. Anyhow however you know full well, that
if you had only expressed a wish to my Mother on the subject
anything would have been done . . .

Mary ends this letter by appealing to "the only feeling
that now seems remaining to you, 'your love for your
wife.' "
Mary's was a courageous act, for she sensed that Mill
might cut her off for such frankness. Certainly he had
cut others off for far more trivial acts or comments. A
key word, emphasized by Mary, tells us something of
fundamental importance for understanding Mill's personality: principle. Under the influence of a notion of
principle—whether the act that called it up was real or
imagined—Mill's behavior contained a moral rigidity
and conceptual absoluteness that allowed little room for
human emotion and apparently no room for human
fallibility. This rigidity illustrates the ossification of fatherly values in Mill, the effects of his education by his
father being more pervasive and long-lasting than he
perhaps realized. He loved his wife, and possibly only
his wife while she lived, and could not allow the
slightest aspersion to be cast upon her or upon their
relationship. Since that relationship lasted through
nineteen years of her former marriage, two of widowhood, and seven and a half of marriage to Mill, it is not
surprising that Mr. and Mrs. John Stuart Mill led a
retiring and isolated life in the 1850s.
Mill's relationship with Harriet Taylor was remarkable in many ways. If one compares Mill's account of her
with other accounts, it becomes evident that Mill was
blinded by his love. Mill would have us believe that a
more noble, more wonderful, more intelligent, more
compassionate human being could not be imagined. But
3 S
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others describe her as a selfish, domineering woman
with a "deep seated masochism" which made her unfit
for normal physical love. "She was clever and remarkable," said George Mill, "but nothing like what
John took her to be." One contemporary maintained
that she parroted John in conversation with others, also
that she listened to him very carefully on one day and
then gave back to him the substance of his talk on the
next. Mill just did not realize that he was only hearing
himself again.
Although probably both the criticism and the praise
of Harriet Taylor are exaggerated, what remains relatively certain is that Mill's image of Harriet does not
square with the real person, that he idealized her,
that she became his symbol of the perfect mind, that
she was, in sum, the idealized principle of perfection in
womanhood. Erich Fromm calls this kind of love
"idolatrous love" and identifies it as a form of
pseudo-love found in some immature people. According to Fromm, "if a person has not reached the level
where he has a sense of identity, of I-ness, rooted in the
productive unfolding of his own powers, he tends to
'idolize' the loved person. He is alienated from his own
powers and projects them into the loved person, who is
worshipped as the summum bonum, the bearer of all
love, all light, all bliss."
Principles or the highest good may tarnish or soil if
allowed to remain in touch for too long with grimier
reality. Perhaps that was one reason for the curious fact
that the Mills spent so much of their married life apart,
now one travelling in search of health, now the other.
Both were ill, it is true, and perhaps needed a change of
scene and climate. But their letters also show them to
have enjoyed missing each other. Beneath the protestations of love runs a gentle current of desire for separation. "Pray my darling," wrote Mill to Harriet when
she decided to return home earlier than expected, "do
not attempt the crossing till you feel better—much bet36
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ter. I am going on here with everything that can be done
& your presence is not at all necessary, pleasant as it
will be."
Despite avowals of the importance of feeling (and
poetry, women and mothers) in life, Mill seemed on
many occasions and with many people to have kept
feeling itself at arm's length. In the Autobiography, Mill
would have us believe that after his crisis his life was
conducted on a different level, with due attention to
motherly values, to poetry and feeling. But ultimately
the change was not profound enough. It became a matter of principle for Mill that he love humanity at large,
that he cultivate the feelings. But it remained a matter of
fact that he could not love individuals enough to forgive
their peccadilloes—real or imagined. The result was
that logos, as Ruth Borchard writes, was forever slaying eros. Or, in other words, the fatherly side of his
conscience was constantly slaying the motherly.
V
Because of the details of Mill's life, one is tempted to
end an analysis of this sort with an indictment of the
overwhelming importance of reason and "fatherly values" in the life of an individual and, universalizing his
experience, in the life of a culture or civilization, especially western civilization. Certainly one is tempted to
"indict" Aristotle and syllogistic logic. But at least with
these actors (Athene, Mill, etc.) such an indictment,
and the generalization upon which it is based, would be
misleading because Athene's parthenogenetic birth
is—like the birth of Jesus for that matter—virtually
unique. Athene is the exception rather than the rule in
Greek culture, and, though it is oversimple to say so,
Orestes' acquittal is attained by allowing the exception
to stand for the rule. Similarly, John Stuart Mill, though
of course not a Greek god, was an exceptional man; if
they do nothing else, his upbringing and accomplishments attest eloquently to that.
42
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On the other hand, one may consider Athene and Mill
as instances of the exception being made into the rule,
instances of the extreme exaggeration of fatherly values
and the rational style. For both Athene and Mill do
point at least by implication to concerns important to
western civilization: motherly and fatherly values in
relation to the civilizing process, and the place and the
function of reason in civilized society. Athene's decision to declare Orestes innocent of the murder of his
mother is viewed in the play as a decision in favor of the
forces of civilization. Also, in arriving at this decision
Athene considers that she is in favor of "the male" and
that she is strongly on her "father's side" (11.738-39).
Freud advances a similar point of view when he writes
the following sentences in "Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis": "A great advance was made in
civilization when men decided to put their inferences
upon a level with the testimony of the senses and to
make the step from matriarchy to patriarchy.—The
prehistoric figures which show a smaller person sitting
upon the head of a larger one are representations of
patrilineal descent: Athene had no mother, but sprang
from the head of Zeus." In light of this statement, the
reactions of Jung and others against Freud may be in
part reactions against the patriarchal bias in Freudian
psychoanalytic thought. Certain other intellectual or
literary movements may be seen in analogous ways.
Romanticism, for example, may be regarded in general
as a revolt against fatherly values. Insofar as fatherly
values are "civilized" values, movements like Jungian
depth psychology and Romanticism represent a
resurgence—and not necessarily in a negative
sense—of "primitive" values in western culture. Fatherly oriented movements indicate a reassertion of the
western status-quo and a reaffirmation of so-called civilized western values. Victorian society as a whole may
be seen, in this framework, to shift from the motherly
values of Romanticism to a more paternalistic order. A
44
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recent book by David Roberts, Paternalism in Early
Victorian England (Rutgers University Press, 1979),
takes this shift as its major premise and explores it.
As far as civilizational analysis is concerned, the
methods used in this interpretation of Mill's life and
work may help us to begin to explore what Benjamin
Nelson has called a "civilization complex," that is, "a
segment of [a] paradigmatic cultural pattern" in western society. and of exploring that complex in the lives
of individuals. For the complex explored here—the
structures of rationality in relation to family patterns,
the life of reason and the life of emotion—may be part of
a larger issue, an issue which Nelson calls "The Rationalization Revolution"; in the context of my argument in this essay, I would define this revolution in
broad terms as the institutionalization of the philosophy
of ends over means. In any case, whatever the uses one
may wish to make of the thematics concerning syllogistic thinking, dropped and recovered middles, fathers
and mothers, male and female, ends and means, logos
and eros, Mill's life and work seem to document not
only the theoretical process by which meaning may be
lost and subsequently recovered (demonstrating that
good work may indeed have "pathological" beginnings) but also the potentially tragic results of an
incomplete recovery.
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'John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, ed. Jack Stillinger (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), p. 3. All subsequent references to the
Autobiography are to this edition, except when otherwise stated,
and are placed in parentheses following the citation from, or reference to, the text.
This sentence was originally the first sentence of the Autobiography; what now stands as the first paragraph is a later addition. I
have studied the original manuscript of the early draft, in the
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archives of the University of Illinois library. Jack Stillinger's edition of it is extremely accurate. See Stillinger, ed., The Early Draft
of John Stuart Mill's 'Autobiography' (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1961). Hereafter, The Early Draft is cited as "Stillinger," and references to it are incorporated into the text.
Bruce Mazlish,James and John Stuart Mill: Father and Son in the
Nineteenth Century (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975), p. 3.
The use of Euler's circles as an illustration of Apollo's argument
was first pointed out to me by a colleague, Marvin Bram; I thank
him for allowing me to base part of my argument on his insights.
The dropped middle should not be mistaken for the principle in
logic known as the excluded middle, a principle which, along with
the law of identity and the law of contradiction, is at the foundation
of precision in logic. The principle of the excluded middle goes like
this: "a plus not-a equals one." Or, in another formulation, "A is
B, or A is not B." Every individual in the universe is, in this
western form of logic, a member either of a (A) or not-a (B). There
is no middle; it is excluded (tertium non datur). It may or may not
be of some significance that the universal validity of this principle
is denied by the school of mathematical intuitionism and by certain
forms of non-western logic in China and India and, in the west, by
the pre-Aristotelian "logic" of Heraclitus.
For reminding me of this important fact and its immediate consequences I am grateful to E.V. Walter.
Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (1956; rpt. New York: Harper
and Row, 1974), p. 32.
"Fromm, p. 35.
Fromm, p. 36.
Fromm, p. 55.
"Fromm, p. 38.
"Virtually all the major biographical accounts of Mill emphasize
this fact. These accounts include Mazlish's work; Michael St.
John Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954); Ruth Borchard, John Stuart Mill: the Man
(London: C.A. Watts and Co., Ltd., 1957); Alexander Bain, John
Stuart Mill: A Criticism, with Personal Recollections (1882; rpt.
New York: August M. Kelly, 1969).
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See A.W. Levi, "The 'Mental Crisis' of John Stuart Mill," The
Psychoanalytic Review, 32 (1945), 91. Levi is one of the first critics
to have made much of Mill's ambivalence. Mazlish explores Mill's
ambivalence in greater detail.
"See also Stillinger, pp. 183-85.
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strates Mill's unquestioning subservience to his father, his studious habits, his constant desire to please and his considerable
interest in logic. Of this time Mill wrote to Comte twenty years
later that it was the happiest of his youth. See John Mill's Boyhood
Visit to France-Being a Journal and Notebook written by John
Stuart Mill in France, 1820-21, ed. Anna Jean Mill (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1960).
This would be a standard psychoanalytic description. See Levi,
pp. 98, 100.
John M. Robson interprets Mill's crisis from the point of view of
Mill's interest in poetry. See Robson, "John Stuart Mill's Theory
of Poetry," University of Toronto Quarterly, 29 (1960), 420-38.
Bain, Borchard, Mazlish, Packe and Stillinger all speak of Mill's
dependence on Harriet Taylor. Many of the primary documents of
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here is that Mill himself believed in—and insisted on—his dependence on her. See H.O. Pappe, John Stuart Mill and the Harriet
Taylor Myth (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1960).
Alice S. Rossi has collected the essays on women's liberation by
both John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill and has written a
perceptive chapter to introduce them. See Alice S. Rossi, ed.,
Essays on Sex Equality (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1970).
J.S. Mill, On Liberty, ed. J.M. Robson, in Collected Works of John
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In fact, one might argue that Mill was so affected that he could not
trust himself to speak with emotion of his father's death and still
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Mill, XIV (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 207-08.
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Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XIV, 219-20.
Hayek, pp. 171-75.
Borchard, p. 67; Stillinger, p. 27.
Bain, p. 166.
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Stillinger, p. 27.
Autobiography, p. xvii.
Fromm, p. 83.
11 April 1854, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XIV, 203.
Stillinger probably has the best short summary of this aspect of
their relationship.
Borchard, p. 34.
The situation in the play is not quite as clear as I have made it
appear, and there is some controversy here as to the meaning of
Athene's verdict. Many critics (Jane Harrison among them) see
Athene's decision as one in favor of patriarchy. Certainly the
language would seem to support this position. Robert Fagles,
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